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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case transferred from
the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Appellant has misstated the issue on appeal because there has been
neither an expansion of the dominant estate (i.e. Tract B), nor a connection of the
Easement to a non-dominant parcel (i.e. Tract C). This misstatement of the issue is
the result of the Lutheran High School's failure to acknowledge the effect of
paragraph 7 of the September 9, 2002 Order Granting Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,
whereby the district court ordered that the owners, tenants, subtenants and
concessionaires of Tract C (the non-dominant parcel) may not use the Easement,
and that Woodlands IV, LLC, shall take all steps necessary to restrict use of the
Easement by Tower IV tenants, subtenants and concessionaires.1

In its argument before the district court, the High School was more accurate in stating
the issue: "[i]f the parking terrace had been large enough to accommodate all of the needs
of Tower III, this parking terrace on the eastern side of Tract B, we wouldn't be here
today." (Transcript of Hearing on Summary Judgment, April 22, 2002, p. 21; R. at 694).

The accurate issue presented by this appeal is:
Did the district court properly grant summary judgment in favor of the Tract
B Property Owners where the use of the Easement by the Tract B owners, tenants,
subtenants and concessionaires and their customers, invitees and guests did not
substantially increase the use of the servient estate beyond that contemplated by
the parties at the time of the grant in 1983, considering the circumstances attending
the transaction, the situation of the parties, and the object to be attained.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when no genuine
issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT
17, f 7, 42 P.3d 379. When the Court reviews a grant of summary judgment, it
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. Lovendahl v. Jordan
School District, 2002 UT 130, f 13, 2002 Utah LEXIS 220; Laney v. Fairview
City, 2002 UT 79, f 9, 57 P.3d 1007. As such, "we consider only whether [the trial
court] correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed issues of
material fact existed." Pigs Gun Club, 2002 UT 17, ^ 7. The Court views all facts
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions that are determinative.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Lutheran High School filed its complaint in November 1996 and
averred that a non-exclusive easement (the "Easement") across the northern
boundary of its property was being overburdened by the construction of an office
building (known as Tower III) at the Woodlands Business Park on 700 East in Salt
Lake County, and by what it averred was the expansion of the dominant parcel
through the inclusion of additional property into the Woodlands Business Park.2
At the time the Easement was granted in 1983, the owners of both the dominant
and the servient parcels contemplated commercial development on their respective
properties. The High School purchased the servient parcel in 1992, changed the
use of the property, and averred in its complaint that the Easement posed a safety
risk to its students.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendants Woodlands III Holdings, LLC, JDJ Properties, Inc., and The
Woodlands Business Park Association, (hereafter collectively referred to as the
A diagram that was used in the district court for illustrative purposes is attached in the
Addendum at Tab "A."
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"Tract B Property Owners") filed their Motion for Summary Judgment
("Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment") on or about September 25, 2001.
The High School thereafter filed its Supplemental Complaint on or about
February 8, 2002, joining Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC, as a defendant. On or
about March 25, 2002, the High School filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.
Woodlands IV Holdings joined in the motion papers in support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment and in opposition to the High School's Motion for
Summary Judgment. The motions were fully briefed by the parties and submitted
to the court for decision, accompanied by a request for oral argument. Both
motions came on for hearing before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler on April 22,
2002.
The district court entered its Minute Entry on April 26, 2002 (R. at 656660), and thereafter entered its written Order Granting Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on
September 8, 2002 (R. at 661- 666; Addendum at Tab "B") granting Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment and denying the High School's Motion for
Summary Judgment. It is from this final order that the High School appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On or about October 27, 1983, Woodland Investment Company, a

Utah limited partnership ("Woodland") owned the real property located at

approximately 4020 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter "Tract A").
(R. at 3, % 9.)
2.

On or about October 27, 1983, Woodlands Associates ("Associates"),

a joint venture of MHP-Woodlands, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, and SLC-1
Limited Partnership, a Wisconsin limited partnership, owned the real property
(hereafter "Tract B") on 700 East, immediately west of Tract A. (R. at 3,110.)
3.

On or about October 27, 1983, Woodland and Associates entered into

a Declaration of Easements, Covenants and Restrictions (the "1983 Declaration"),
which was recorded in the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder on October
27, 1983, as Entry 3862259, Book 5502, Page 1559.3 (R. at 14-24; Addendum at
Tab "C")
4.

In the 1983 Declaration, Woodland and Associates granted each other

reciprocal non-exclusive easements appurtenant to and across their respective
tracts. (1983 Declaration If 4 (a), (b); R. at 18-19; Addendum at Tab "C") The
easement that benefits Tract B as the dominant estate, and burdens Tract A as the
The legal descriptions that were exhibits to the 1983 Declaration were reversed, so an
Amended Declaration of Easements, Covenants and Restrictions (the "1984
Declaration") was recorded on June 20, 1984 as Entry No. 3957731, Book 5566, Page
2146, to correctly set forth the respective parcels. A copy of the 1984 Declaration is at
R. 188-193.
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servient estate, is referred to as the "Associates Roadway" in the 1983 Declaration,
and is referred to herein as the "Easement."
5.

The express grant of the Easement reads in part:
Woodland [predecessor to Lutheran High School] grants to
Associates [owners of future Woodlands Business Park] a
nonexclusive easement appurtenant to and across Tract A
[High School Property] for the purpose of allowing
vehicular access between the public streets and any and all
parking areas or roadways and lanes situated on Tract B
[Woodlands Business Park], provided, that the foregoing
right of access shall be limited to use for such purposes and
to such extent as may be customary for use of Tract B for
commercial purposes (including, but not limited to,
reasonable and customary deliveries). The easement granted
by this subsection (a) shall be limited to the roadway
described on Exhibit "D" (the "Associates Roadway").
In addition to the foregoing, Associates shall have the right
to elevate or sink the western twenty (20) feet of the
Associates Roadway in order to align the same with the
upper and/or lower decks of a parking ramp....

(1983 Declaration,^ 4(a).)
6.

The 1983 Declaration allows for: (1) the possibility that the zoning for

Tract B might change over time; (2) a building complex on Tract B (Id. at ^ 2(b));
(3) a theater-restaurant on Tract B (Id. at 2(c)); (4) a health club on Tract B (Id. at
U 2(d)); (5) more than one building on Tract B (Id. at ^ 2(d)); (6) a parking ramp on
Tract B with upper and lower levels (Id. at ^ 4(a), 4(b)(iii)); and (7) parking areas,
roadways and lanes on Tract B. (Id. at ^j 4(a).)

7.

Minutes of a November 22, 1983 Salt Lake County Planning

Commission meeting that took place fewer than 30 days after the Easement was
granted, confirm that the intention of the owner of Tract B, without any objection
from the owner of Tract A, was to build retail space and three office towers on
Tract B of five stories, eight stories and twelve stories in height, plus a four level
parking structure east of the high rises. (Minutes of Salt Lake County Planning
Commission, November 22, 1983; R. at 187, Addendum at Tab "D.")
8.

The 1983 Declaration also granted an easement across Tract B to

provide access to Tract A from 700 East for commercial purposes on Tract A.
This easement over Tract B to benefit Tract A (the "Woodland Roadway" in the
1983 Declaration), was restricted to seven (7) feet in height so it would not
interfere with the parking structure to be built on Tract B. (1983 Declaration,
114(b); R. at 19.)
9.

The respective easements appurtenant to Tracts A and B were for the

benefit of the parties and their respective tenants, concessionaires, customers,
invitees and guests as well as the concessionaires, customers, invitees and guests of
the tenants and subtenants of the respective parties. (1983 Declaration, ^ 4(d);
R.at 19.)
10.

The development of the Woodlands Business Park that was intended

at the time of the 1983 Declaration proceeded; however, instead of three office

towers measuring five stories, eight stories and twelve stories in height (a total of
twenty-five (25) stories), the office towers ended up being six stories, eight stories
and four stories (a total of only eighteen (18) stories). Also, instead of
concentrating the office tower parking in a single multi-level parking structure, a
smaller parking structure was built on Tract B east of the office towers, and a
second parking structure was built several years later on Tract C contiguous to and
to the north of Tract B. This second parking structure can be accessed from within
Tract B as well as from 700 East and 3900 South. (Dahistrom Aff, fflf 5-9; R. at
217, 218; Addendum at Tab "E.")
11.

While Tract B was developed as commercial property as expressly

contemplated by the 1983 Declaration, Tract A was not. Neither a theaterrestaurant, nor a health club was ever built. Instead, Tract A was sold in 1992 to
the Lutheran High School Association of the Greater Salt Lake Area, a Utah nonprofit corporation, dba Salt Lake Lutheran High School (the "High School"),
which built a private high school on the property. (Complaintfflf1, 12; R. at 2-4.)
12.

Woodlands III Holdings, LLC ("Woodlands III") is a Utah limited

liability company that owns two of the office towers (Towers II and III) and one
retail building on Tract B. (Dahistrom Aff.ffl[4, 5, 7; R. at 217; Addendum at Tab
"E.")

13.

JDJ Properties, Inc. ("JDJ") is a Utah corporation that owns the one

office tower (Tower I) and one retail building on Tract B. (Id. at 3;ffl[3, 7; R. at
217.)
14.

The Woodlands Business Park Association ("Woodlands

Association") is a Utah corporation that owns the parking structure on Tract B.
(Id. at P ; R . at 217-218.)
15.

The Woodlands Business Park has four main entrances on 700 East,

that are the primary routes of most of the tenants and patrons of the Woodlands
Business Park. (Peacock Aff. % 5; R. at 563; Addendum at Tab "F.")
16.

Tower IV, owned by Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC ("Woodlands

IV"), is built on Tract C, immediately north of Tract B. The construction of Tower
IV was commenced in June 2000 and was completed in July 2001. (Supplemental
Complaint, ^ 3; R. at 402; Peacock Aff. f 3; R. at 563.)
17.

Woodlands IV is a Utah limited liability company and is a distinct

business entity separate from the other defendants in this lawsuit. (Supplemental
Complaint ^f 3a; R. at 402; Answer to Supplemental Complaint ^ 3, R. at 407.)
18.

While Tract C was added to the Woodlands Business Park

Association by virtue of a Sixth Amendment To Declaration Of Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions Of The Woodlands Business Park, recorded March 4,
1996, the parties to the amended CC&R's "acknowledged and agreed that
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admission of the Additional Property to the Association in no way permits the use
of that certain 'Associates Roadway' adjacent to the boundary of the Association
as defined in [the 1983 Declaration]." (R. at 490; Addendum at Tab "G.") In other
words, the right to the Easement was expressly withheld when Tract C was added
to The Woodlands Business Park in 1996.
19.

The Easement is non-exclusive and is also used by Lutheran High

School students, neighborhood residents, and condominium owners who live in a
condominium development immediately north of the High School (and the
Easement). The Easement also provides needed access to fire trucks and
ambulances. (Peacock Aff. ^ 4; R. at 563.)
20.

Although the 1983 Declaration requires it to do so, the High School

does not maintain the Easement. The Property Owners in Tract B regularly
maintain the easement year round, including snow plowing during the winter.
{Id. at H 6; R. at 564.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
An easement may not overburden the servient estate, and to determine
whether an easement is being overburdened, a court must look back to the grant of
the easement and determine the parties' intent by considering the circumstances
attending the transaction, the situation of the parties, and the object to be attained.
The Utah courts have been called upon many times to determine the intent of the

parties at the time the easement was originally granted in order to ascertain what
current use may be made of the servient estate for the benefit of the dominant
estate. In Utah, appurtenant easements have been litigated since the nineteenth
century. See, e.g. Clawson v. Wallace, 16 Utah 300, 52 P. 9 (Utah 1898).
In this instance, the parties who granted these reciprocal appurtenant
easements across Tracts A and B intended that the Easement across Tract A in
favor of Tract B was 'for the purpose of allowing vehicular access between the
public streets and any and all parking areas or roadways and lanes situated on
Tract B provided, that the foregoing right of access shall be limited to use for such
purposes and to such extent as may be customary for use of Tract Bfor
commercial purposes (including, but not limited to, reasonable and customary
deliveries):' (1983 Declaration, % 4(a).)
The 1983 Declaration granting the Easement speaks of expansive
commercial development of Tract B, including a building complex, parking lots, a
parking ramp with upper and lower decks, roadways, and lanes. The 1983
Declaration anticipates possible zoning changes and further commercial growth on
Tract B, including a dinner theater and a health club, neither of which has been
built.
The record evidence of the minutes of the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission, dated November 22, 1983, fewer than thirty days after the Easement

was granted, demonstrate that the owner of Tract B, without any objection from the
owner of the servient parcel (Tract A), intended that the commercial development
of Tract B would include retail space and three office buildings totaling twenty five
stories in height, with all of the necessary parking, including a four story parking
structure.
The servient estate (Tract A) has not been overburdened, which is the correct
issue, and the notion that the dominant estate (Tract B) has been expanded is an
inaccurate one. Although Tract C was added to The Woodlands Business Park,
this additional property was never granted any right to use the Easement, and the
district court specifically directed Woodlands IV to take all necessary steps to
assure that all those associated with Tower IV located on the non-dominant parcel
do not use the Easement. The order in pertinent part reads:
The owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires
of Tract C and their customers, invitees and guests, may not
use the Easement. Accordingly, Woodlands IV Holdings,
LLC, shall take all steps necessary to restrict use of the
Easement by the Tower IV tenants, subtenants and
concessionaires and their customers, invitees and guests,
including notifying them, restricting access as part of the
lease agreements, and such other steps as may be
appropriate.
(Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, f 7; Addendum at Tab "B.") The High

School does not allege that this part of the district court's order was error, therefore
no appealable issue is presented with respect to Tower IV.
This case does not present a case of first impression. When an easement is
disputed, Utah law requires the courts to examine the intent of the parties at the
time an easement was granted to determine if an unreasonable burden is currently
being placed on the servient estate. There is no "Bright Line Rule" that can avoid
this effort. Furthermore, the High School's "Bright Line Rule" is much more dim
than the High School represents.
Existing Utah case law applied to the undisputed facts justifies granting
summary judgment in favor of Woodlands III Holdings, LLC, JDJ Properties, Inc.,
and The Woodlands Business Park Association, where the use of the Easement is
consistent with the burden on the servient estate that was intended by the original
grantor and grantee.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES TO THE EASEMENT WAS FOR
TRACT B TO BE DEVELOPED COMMERCIALLY
In 1983, when the prior owners of Tracts A and B granted each other non-

exclusive easements over their respective parcels, each envisioned broad
commercial development. Tract B was to be developed into retail space and three
office towers, with all of the necessary parking and roadways to accommodate the
tenants, concessionaires and their customers. The parking needs for Tract B were

necessarily commensurate with the amount of square footage developed. See, e.g.
R. at 577. Tract A, where the High School is now located, was to be developed
into a dinner theater and a health club. The parties agreed that if a dinner theater
and a health club were not built within a specified period of time on Tract A, the
owners of Tract B could build both on Tract B. The High School came on the
scene nearly a decade later and changed the use of Tract A. Although the High
School does not have a right to the easement it presently uses over Tract B, the
Tract B Property Owners have never complained.
In addition to the express grant of the Easement, the 1983 Declaration
contains the following references evidencing the parties' intent for the nature of the
burden to be placed on the servient estate:
No party shall attempt to obtain or consent to any
change or variance in zoning of Tract B if such change
would jeopardize the right of Woodland, its successors and
assigns, to retain and maintain any sign described in Section
3 of this Declaration.
(1983 Declaration, Tj 2(a)(emphasis added).)
The official name of any building complex located
on Tract B will contain the word "Woodland" or
" Woodlands" unless the use of such word is not permitted
by applicable laws, regulations or ordinances....
(Id. at ^ 2(b) (emphasis added).)
No part of Tract B shall, for a period of twenty-five
(25) years following the date of this Declaration, be used as
a Theater-Restaurant; provided, that this restriction shall be

void if no Theater-Restaurant is operated on Tract A for a
continuous period of sixty (60) months. . . .
(Mat 1f2(c).)
If construction of a Health Club on Tract A is
commenced before the latter of one (1) year from the date
of this Declaration or nine (9) months after the
commencement of construction of the first building on
Tract B, then for as long as such Health Club is completed
within a reasonable time and continuously available to the
Parties with respect to Tract B and all tenants of such Parties
and all of the personnel of such tenants, at prices
competitive with or less than those being charged at Health
Clubs open to the general public, no Health Club will be
operated on Tract B or directly or indirectly by Associates
(but not its successors) within a radius of 5/8s of a mile of
Tract A.
(Id. at ^f 2(d)(emphasis added).)
In addition to the foregoing, Associates shall have the right
to elevate or sink the western twenty (20) feet of the
Associates Roadway in order to align the same with the
upper and/or lower decks of a parking ramp. On or
before November 30, 1984 Woodland agrees to construct a
paved roadway twenty-five (25) feet wide on the Associates
Roadway in accordance with good construction practices.
(Id. at % 4(a)(emphasis added).)
A parking ramp or any similar structure may be
constructed on Tract B except over the Woodland
Roadway, and Associates may route all traffic using the
Connecting Roadway through such structure on the upper
and/or the lower deck of any such structure.
(Id. at % 4(b)(iii)(emphasis added).)

On November 22, 1983, fewer than thirty days following the 1983
Declaration, the owner of Tract B presented its development plans to the Salt Lake
Planning Commission. The Planning Commission minutes read in pertinent part:
#PL-83-3013- The Woodland Assoc. - 4405 South 700 EastOffice/Commercial Complex - Zone C-2- (Millcreek)
This project was given conceptual approval previously.
They have refiled as a PUD to allow a variance in the height
requirements of the buildings. They are proposing the north
retail building to be two stories a bank building on the south
comer of the project. The south office tower will be 5
stories, the middle one 8 stories, and the tower to the north
12 stories in height. There will be a multi-level parking
structure east of the high rises which will be four levels high
at the highest point. The staff recommended approval
subject to the conditions on file.
John Hampshire, representing the applicant, stated all the
retail facility and the center 8 story tower building will be
Phase I. The bank could be developed at anytime during the
first phase. Basically they will construct the plateau and
plaza level including all the front landscaping as part of the
first phase. The 5 story tower would be Phase II, and the 12
story as the last phase. The completion date for the entire
project being approximately four years.
There was no one else present for or against the application.
(R. at 224.)
The High School contends repeatedly in its brief that but for the additional
parking structure on Tract C, the third office tower on Tract B would never have
been approved. Whether or not this was the case, the record before the district

court does not yield the answer. The correspondence and conditional use
approvals to which the High School refers make no suggestion that a parking
structure on Tract C was a condition to construction of Tower III. In fact, the June
7, 1996 letter from Mark Brenchley to a senior planner at the Salt Lake County
Planning Commission (R. at 577) refers specifically to Tower IV, not Tower III,
and a letter Mr. Brenchley received from The Planning Commission (R. at 580)
refers to an office building at 3949 South 700 East, which is the address for Tower
IV. The High School had six years to conduct its discovery to flesh this out and
cannot claim that there are inferences to be drawn from these documents in the
High School's favor when none of these documents make any specific reference to
a requirement for a parking structure to be built on Tract C before the Planning
Commission would allow Tower III to be built on Tract B. The original approval
for Tower III was granted in 1983, along with approval for a four story parking
structure on Tract B, immediately east of the three high rises. {See R. at 224.)
Conceptually, the parking structure on Tract B could have been enlarged to its
originally intended four levels to accommodate the tenants of Tower III and the
record does not suggest that Tower III was ever precluded from this option.
In any event, whether the approval of Tower III was ever conditioned on a
parking structure being built on Tract C is a red herring. The issue is whether the

commercial development of Tract B has overburdened the servient estate beyond
what the grantor and grantee intended in 1983.
II.

THE USE OF THE EASEMENT DOES NOT EXCEED WHAT THE
PARTIES INTENDED
As it turned out, much less development actually occurred on Tract B than

was originally envisioned. Instead of retail space, plus three office towers totaling
twenty-five stories, plus a four story parking structure, plus a health club, plus a
theater-restaurant, there actually exists retail space, three towers totaling eighteen
stories and a smaller parking structure. The anticipated health club and theaterrestaurant were never built.
The volume of traffic and the amount of parking space needed for Tract B is
quite logically commensurate with the square footage of the office and retail space
that has been developed on Tract B. (See R. at 577.) Additional parking for Tract
B tenants, concessionaires and their customers on Tract C does not increase the
burden placed on the servient estate (Tract A) beyond what would otherwise occur
had all of the parking for Tract B been built on the dominant parcel as originally
intended.
Furthermore, the use of the Easement by the Tract B tenants meets the
precise language of the grant. The non-exclusive Easement runs west from 900
East across the High School's property to the eastern edge of Tract B where it
meets one of the roadways within Tract B. Only after an automobile has entered

one of the roadways does the driver elect to either proceed to parking lots on Tract
B, or to parking on Tract C, or perhaps to curbside parking on 700 East. In other
words, the Easement cannot be used to drive directly to Tract C. Instead, the
Easement is used, as the 1983 Declaration directs, "for the purpose of allowing
vehicular access between the public streets and any and all parking areas or
roadways and lanes situated on Tract B ... for such purposes and to such extent as
may be customary for use of Tract Bfor commercial purposes." (Emphasis
added.)
Woodlands IV developed Tract C immediately to the north of Tract B
between approximately 1996 and 2001, by building an office building (Tower IV)
and a parking structure. Tract C is accessed primarily from main entrances on 700
East or from 3900 South. Although Tract C was added to The Woodlands
Business Park Association in 1996, any right of Tract C to use the Easement was
specifically withheld by the Tract B Property Owners.
Woodlands IV was joined as a defendant in this lawsuit very late in the
game, after the Tract B Property Owners had filed their motion for summary
judgment. Woodlands IV joined in the Tract B Property Owners' motion papers
and, together Woodlands IV and the Tract B Property Owners, immediately
conceded to the district court that there was no legal precedent that would allow
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Woodlands IV and the tenants of Tower IV to use the Easement. Accordingly, the
district court ordered Woodlands IV as follows:
The owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires
of Tract C and their customers, invitees and guests, may not
use the Easement. Accordingly, Woodlands IV Holdings,
LLC, shall take all steps necessary to restrict use of the
Easement by the Tower IV tenants, subtenants and
concessionaires and their customers, invitees and guests,
including notifying them, restricting access as part of the
lease agreements, and such other steps as may be
appropriate.
(Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, f 7.) The district court properly
granted summary judgment because Tower IV tenants were precluded from the
Easement and the Tract B tenants' use of the Easement is consistent with the intent
of the parties at the time the Easement was granted.
III.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE EASEMENT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED
IN FAVOR OF THE TRACT B PROPERTY OWNERS AND IN
LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
The correct statement of the relevant Utah law is that in construing

instruments creating easements in land, the court should construe the instrument
most strongly against the grantor, and most favorably to the grantee, and should
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties by looking to the
circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of the parties, the state of the
thing granted, and the object to be attained. Stevens v. Bird-Jex Co,, 18 P.2d 292,

294 (Utah 1933); Wood v. Ashby, 253 P. 2d. 351, 353 (Utah 1952); Wykoffv.
Barton, 646 P. 2d 756, 758 (Utah 1982). If the provisions of the instrument leave
some doubt as to their meaning, the court may also look to the practical
construction placed upon the instrument by the parties. Id.
The Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.1 is consistent with
Utah law and supports looking to the 1983 Declaration and to extrinsic evidence
such as the minutes of the Salt Lake Planning Commission to determine what the
parties intended in order to carry out that purpose. Section 4.1 of the Restatement
reads in part:
A servitude should be interpreted to give effect to the
intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in
the instrument, or the circumstances surrounding creation of
the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it was
created.
The High School is unable to explain why the development plans for Tract B
revealed in the Planning Commission minutes fewer than 30 days after the
Easement was granted should not be relied upon to ascertain the parties' intent.
We know the grantee's intent from the record evidence. In 1983, the developer
proposed a plan that included retail space, three office towers totaling 25 stories of
office space, plus a four-level parking structure. We know that this plan was
approved by the Planning Commission. We also know the grantor's (Captain
Nemo) intent because he had years to challenge these development plans, as well

as the actual construction, but failed to do so before he sold the servient estate
(Tract A) to the High School in 1992. If the grantor of the Easement had opposed
the development of Tract B, surely the High School would have uncovered some
evidence of the grantor's opposition during the six years this lawsuit languished in
the district court. The High School was simply unable to proffer even a scintilla of
evidence to controvert the Planning Commission minutes that are entirely
consistent with the 1983 Declaration and its specific references to more than one
building, a building complex, future zoning changes, parking lots, a parking ramp
with upper and lower decks, roadways, lanes, and perhaps eventually a health club
and a theater-restaurant. The very fact that the 1984 Declaration,4 which was
recorded to correct the reversed legal descriptions for Tracts A and B in the
original 1983 Declaration, was not otherwise amended, is further evidence that the
grantor had no objection to the announced development of Tract B and that the
development was consistent with his intent.

IV. TRACT B'S PLANNED DEVELOPMENT AND RESULTING USE
OF THE EASEMENT IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE EASEMENT
AND SUPPORTED BY CASE LAW
While overburdening an easement is not permitted, overburdening can only
occur if the use of the easement substantially increases the use of the servient

See fn. 3, supra.

estate beyond that contemplated by the parties at the time of the grant. Wood v.
Ashby, supra, 253 P.2d at 354.
When an easement grant contains general language without specific limits,
the easement is construed to mean a general right of way capable of all reasonable
use. F. T. Chen, Annotation, Extent and Reasonableness of Use of Private Way in
Exercise of Easement Granted in General Terms, 3 A.L.R.3d 1256, § 2[a] (2001).
The easement grant at issue here is very broad, its only nominal limitation being
that it is restricted to the customary use of Tract B for commercial purposes.
The use that may be made of an easement is not static. When the grant
contemplates commercial development, the easement should be interpreted to
allow normal development of the dominant estate. This is the recommendation of
the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.10 which has readily been
adopted:
[T]he beneficiary of an easement or profit is entitled to make
any use of the servient estate that is reasonably necessary for
the convenient enjoyment of the servitude for its intended
purpose. The manner, frequency, and intensity of the
beneficiary's use of the servient estate may change over time
to take advantage of developments in technology and to
accommodate normal development of the dominant estate or
enterprise benefited by the servitude.
Abington Ltd. Partnership v. Heublein et al, 1X1 A.2d 1232, 1240 (Conn. 1998)
(citing Restatement (Third) Of Property (Servitudes) § 4.10); Cooper v. Sawyer,
405 P.2d 394, 401 (Hawaii 1965) ("where the grant of easement is unrestricted (as

it was here as to the right of ingress and egress) the use of the dominant tenement
may reasonably be enlarged"); see also, 3 A.L.R.3d 1256 (reasonable use
encompasses any purpose to which the dominant land may be naturally devoted,
and the normal and necessary development the owner may choose to make,
including improvements and modem inventions).
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed this approach in Burke-Tarr
Company v. Ferland Corporation, 724 A.2d 1014 (R.I. 1999), where the plaintiff
sought to terminate an easement because the defendant built an apartment complex
on the dominant estate, where previously there had only been a single cottage. The
court rejected the claim that the easement was only intended for access to a single
cottage, saying "a right-of-way will be construed in favor of the grantee, limited
only by what is reserved expressly in the instrument and the accompanying
circumstances to demonstrate the intent of the parties." Id. at 1018. The easement
at issue created an unrestricted grant of access to the property, and the construction
of a 191-unit apartment complex was an increase in degree, not type of use. Id. at
1019.
In the present case, Tract B has been developed commercially, and has
actually been developed to a lesser degree than was originally intended.

Allowing Tract B tenants to use the Easement regardless of where their
parking is located, does not run afoul of the rule recited in the Restatement (Third)
of Property (Servitudes) § 4.11 which states:
Unless the terms of the servitude determined under
§4.1 provide otherwise, an appurtenant easement or profit
may not be used for the benefit of property other than the
dominant estate. (Emphasis added.)
While Woodlands IV's use of the easement would admittedly violate this
principle, the Tract B tenants who might use the right of way to access parking,
even if that parking is not on the dominant estate, is certainly for the benefit of the
dominant estate, rather than for the benefit of property other than the dominant
estate. The grant language u[f]or the purpose of allowing vehicular access
between the public streets and any and all roadways and lanes situated on Tract
B" actually accounts for the use currently being made by the Tract B tenants to
access parking on Tract C, especially when read in the context of the further
language in the 1983 Declaration which declares the scope of the easement to be
"to such extent as may be customary for use of Tract Bfor commercial purposes. "
(1983 Declaration, 1f 4(a).) Read together, the provisions of the 1983 Declaration
grant access not only to the parking areas on Tract B, but also "to allow vehicular
access to all roadways and lanes on Tract B as may be customary for use of Tract
Bfor commercial purposes.1' (Id.)

V.

THE HIGH SCHOOL'S BRIGHT LINE IS REALLY QUITE DIM
The High School suggests, citing State ex rel Fisher v. McNutt, 597 N.E.2d

539 (Ohio App. 1992), that there is a "universal rule" that if one acquires a right of
way through one lot or parcel of land, he or she cannot use it to gain access to that
parcel and thence over his or her own land to other lands belonging to him or her.
(Brief of the Appellant, p. 17.) Although the case generally suggests the
proposition that the High School says it does, it turns out that this is not necessarily
the rule in Ohio, and it is certainly not a universal rule. When we were before the
district court, the High School included the same supposed quote referencing a
"universal rule" in its motion papers. (R. at 423.) We searched for this quote in
the text of the opinion, all to no avail. We did find, however, that the High School,
then as now, has blended two separate paragraphs from the appellant's
Assignments of Error in the Ohio decision's appendix in order to formulate a quote
supposedly attributable to the court about a "universal rule." We find this
deceptive, but more importantly, State ex rel. Fisher was subsequently
distinguished by another Ohio appellate court, which referred to the language
relied on in State ex rel Fisher as being merely dicta. See, Proffitt v. Plymesser,
2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2801, *4 (June 25, 2001) (not reported in N.E.2d) attached
at Addendum at Tab "H." The Proffitt court held that an easement may indeed be

used to access additional property so long as the use does not increase the burden
to the servient estate. Id. at *4-5.
In Proffitt v. Plymesser, the owner of the servient estate alleged that the
owner of the dominant estate had increased his farming operation from seventy
acres in the original dominant estate to one hundred eighty-five acres and was
using the easement that had originally been granted for ingress and egress to the
seventy acres to also access the additional one hundred fifteen acres. Id. at *3.
The Ohio Court of Appeals held that the use of the easement was proper absent a
showing that there was any measurable increase in traffic on the right-of-way due
to traffic accessing acreage beyond the seventy-acre plat. Id. at *4-5.
Proffitt v. Plymesser is instructive on a number of points. It illustrates that
the accurate issue is whether the use of the Easement overburdens the servient
estate, not whether the dominant estate has been expanded. It further illustrates
that there is no "bright line rule" that can be invoked to avoid litigation. The court
in Ohio did precisely what a court in Utah must do - it gave effect to the intention
of the parties at the time of the grant by looking to the circumstances attending the
transaction, the situation of the parties, the state of the thing granted, and the object
to be attained.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut took an approach similar to that taken in
Proffitt v. Plymesser when it addressed a situation where there was a question
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about using an easement to access a parcel adjacent to the dominant parcel. In
Abington Limited Partnership v. Heublein, supra.5 (acknowledged in Reporter's
Note to Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.11), a Science Center
held an easement to permit access to its property where it conducted its science
programs. The Science Center subsequently acquired the use of an adjacent parcel
of property and constructed a building containing administrative offices,
classrooms, television studios and a planetarium. The issue was whether the
easement could be used to gain access to this second piece of property. The
Connecticut Supreme Court, relying on its earlier precedent and the Restatement
(Third) of the Law of Property (Servitudes), held that while an easement of access
does not automatically attach to after-acquired property, in some circumstances the
parties at the time of the creation of an easement may be found to have
contemplated, as a matter of law, that its benefits might accrue to adjacent property
that was not formally within the terms of the easement. To determine the intent of
the parties at the time the easement was granted, a court reasonably may take into
account the proposed use and the likely development of the dominant estate by
examining the relevant documents at the time of the original conveyance.

5

See also, Abington Limited Partnership v. Heublein, 257 Conn. 570; 2001 Conn.

LEXIS 336 (2001).

The High School also cites DND Neffson Co. v. Galleria Partners, 745 P.2d
206 (Ariz. App. 1987) and Perm Bowling Recreation Center v. Hot Shoppes, 1179
F. 2d 64, 66 (D.C.Cir. 1949), which are inapposite. These cases stand for the
proposition that patrons from a non-dominant parcel should not have access to the
easement through the dominant parcel. We agree. However, this proposition does
not advance the High School's cause.6 The district court's order in our case
unconditionally prevents Woodlands IV and the patrons of its Tower IV from
using the Easement. The High School infers that the district court's order will be

6

Likewise, the High School cites to McCammon v. Meredith,830 S.W.2d 577, 580

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); McCann v. R. W. Dunteman Co.,609 N.E. 2d 1076 (111. App. Ct.
1993); McLaughlin v. Bd of Selectmen of Amherst, 664 N.E. 2d 786, 790 (Mass. 1996)
and others for the similar proposition that an easement may not be expanded to the
benefit of property not part of the dominant estate. In the present case, allowing Tract B
tenants to use the Easement to access roadways within Tract B that ultimately lead to a
parking structure on Tract C benefits Tract B, not Tract C. Thus, these cases do not
advance the High School's argument. McCann is further distinguishable because the
court had specifically found that there was a substantial increase in the burden to the
servient estate and that the burden benefited non-dominant estate property. Neither is the
case here.

disobeyed. There is no record that this has ever occurred. Moreover, this issue is
not on appeal, is not before this Court and does not present an appealable issue, but
rather is appropriately a matter to address with the district court should the district
court's order ever be disregarded.
The absence of a bright line rule is further indicated in the High School's
own brief. After prominently relying on the analysis set forth in the Restatement
(Third) of Property, a footnote is later dropped to explain that there are indications
there may be a shift in the rule. For example, in Ogle v. Trotter, 495 S.W.2d 558
(Tenn.Ct.App.1973), the court stated that the purpose of the prohibition against
extending the benefit of an easement to non-appurtenant land is to avoid increased
burden. Accordingly, the Tennessee court reasoned that where there has been a
reduction in the use of the easement, an injunction is not proper. Similarly, in
Carbone v. Vigliotti, 610 A.2d 565 (Conn. 1992), the court found that the addition
of parcels to the dominant estate, forming a one-building lot, did not changed the
character or extent of the easement's use. The court distinguished an earlier case,
which held that an easement can only be used to benefit the dominant estate,
because, unlike in Carbone, the earlier case involved a material increase in the use
of the easement.
Likewise, in Joiner v. Southwest Central Rural Electric Co-op., 786 A.2d
349 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 2001) the court vacated the lower court's ruling that relied on

the Restatement's prohibition against the use of an appurtenant easement to the
benefit of a property other than the dominant estate. The Pennsylvania court
reasoned that the Restatement provisions were "at variance with the
pronouncements of [Pennsylvania's] Supreme Court." Id. at 351. It stated that the
court was required to look to the language of the grant, and, if the "purposes of an
express easement are not specifically stated, the court must ascertain the
objectively manifested intention of the parties in light of the circumstances." Id. at
352.
In Heartz v. City of Concord, 808 A.2d 76 (N.H. 2002), the New Hampshire
Supreme Court rejected a per se prohibition on property other than the dominant
estate benefiting from an easement. Rather, the court examined the language of the
easement and found that nothing in deed's language "indicates an intention to
prevent non-dominant, third-party tenements from benefiting from the easement."
Id. at 81. The court then addressed the contention that the use should not be
allowed because it overburdened the easement. It held that the appellant's
conclusory statements that the "property will be damaged is insufficient to satisfy
his burden in opposing [the appellee's] summary judgment motion." Id. at 82.
VI.

UTAH CASE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT ENJOINING TRACT B
TENANTS' USE OF THE EASEMENT
The High School's reliance on Utah cases including Wood v. Ashby, 253

P.2d 351 (1952) and Alvey v. Mackelprang, 2002 UT App 220, 51 P.2d 45 is

misdirected. These cases suggest that ". . . an easement is extinguished when after
the division of the dominant estate, a new created parcel does not abut the servient
tenement." (Appellant's Brief at pp. 14-15.) This is obviously not the
circumstance in our case.
In Alvey v. Mackelprang the dominant estate was divided such that Alvey
received the severed portion of the dominant estate that no longer abutted the
servient estate. Alvey claimed that although his parcel had been severed from the
dominant estate, that the prescriptive right-of-way was still appurtenant to his
parcel. Id. The Court of Appeals found that there are at least four basic
requirements that must be met for a prescriptive easement to survive a division of
the dominant tenement, including the requirement that the newly created parcel
must "abut the way." Alvey v. Mackelprang, 2002 Ut. App. 220, at ^f 13. The
present case does not involve a prescriptive easement and, more importantly, the
issue presented by this appeal is whether the Tract B tenants' use of the Easement
overburdens the Easement, not whether a portion of Tract B has been severed and
whether the owner of the severed parcel continues to have a right to the Easement.
Wood v. Ashby involved a somewhat similar circumstance involving the
division of the dominant estate. In that case the severed portion of the dominant
estate continued to "abut the way," and the court had to ascertain whether the
intent of the original grantor and grantee of the easement was for a right of way

passing though a gate, or whether the easement could be drawn so as to allow
access to the severed portion of the dominant estate as well.
The issue of whether an easement remains appurtenant to a parcel severed
from the dominant estate is not before the court in this appeal and neither Wood
nor Mackelprang is helpful in this regard. Wood, however, is helpful for its
proposition that the court must determine whether the use being placed on the
easement results in a substantial increase in the use of the servient estate other than
that contemplated by the parties at the time of the grant, looking to the
circumstances attending the transaction, situation of the parties, and the object to
be attained. Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d at 354.
Such cases as Wade and Weggeland, both cited by the High School, are not
helpful either. Weggeland, for instance, addresses whether the easement in that
case was intended to be exclusive, or whether the grantor retained a right to use his
own property. The court found that the easement was not exclusive unless the
grant said so under the principle that "[t]he language of the grant is the measure
and the extent of the right created. " Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 384 P.2d 590, 591
(Utah 1963).
In Wade, the grantor deeded a piece of property without mentioning whether
he intended to also convey an accompanying easement for ingress and egress. The
court found that the right of way was implicit in the conveyance, although the

width of the implied easement was limited to the width of the grantee's
automobile, according to the principle that the u[c]haracter and extent [of the
easement] is limited to such as is reasonably necessary and convenient to the
dominate estate. " Wade v. Dorius, 173 P. 564, 566 (Utah 1933)(citations omitted).
Obviously the principle in Weggeland is not helpful at all and the principle
we get from Wade must be considered in view of the language of the 1983
Declaration that Tract B may use the Easement "to such extent as may be
customary for use of Tract Bfor commercial purposes. " (1983 Declaration,

114(a).)
The Easement here has never been used for anything other than its intended
purpose and has never been overburdened. Commercial development of Tract B
was explicitly contemplated in the 1983 Declaration, and nothing in the 1983
Declaration otherwise restricts the commercial development. In fact, the 1983
Declaration clearly anticipates additional future development in the event Tract A
was not developed. Most importantly, the development of Tract B proceeded just
as planned as the record evidence of the minutes of the Salt Lake Planning
Commission show, except that smaller office towers totaling only eighteen (18)
stories, rather than twenty-five (25) stories, were actually built.
Whether parking for the office towers takes place in a single parking
structure, or in two structures, makes no difference; the number of cars associated

with the originally contemplated twenty-five (25) stories of office space is the
same. In fact, the number of cars originally intended would logically have been
greater than the current use by the Tract B tenants.
VII. EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE EASEMENT IS NOT THE PROPER
REMEDY FOR MISUSE OF AN EASEMENT, PARTICULARLY
WHEN THE HIGH SCHOOL HAS FAILED TO PROVE ANY
INJURY
Although we believe we have made a persuasive argument why the district
court should be affirmed, the High School's demand for relief deserves some
mention.
The High School demands that the Easement be extinguished. This is not
the appropriate remedy, even if the court determines that the dominant estate has
misused the easement. McCann v. R. W. Dunteman Co,, 609 N.E. 2d 1076, at 1084
(111. App. Ct. 1993) (finding that the forfeiture of the subject easement would be
"thoroughly inappropriate" in part because the lower court had ordered that nondominate estate traffic thereon be eliminated); see, Jon W. Bruce and James W.
Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land, § 1026 (although the
concept that an easement may be extinguished by misuse has been recognized by
many courts and commentators, it has rarely been employed to terminate a
servitude). In Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986), the Washington
Supreme Court refused to extinguish an easement where the servient estate failed

to prove actual injury, and, in Penn Bowling, 1179 F. 2d at 66, the court ruled that
misuse of an easement right is not sufficient to constitute a forfeiture.
In this case, the High School has not demonstrated any injury at all, although
it has had six years to build a case. Obviously, if the High School's students had
been placed at increased risk the High School would have undertaken preventative
measures and asked for a preliminary injunction long ago. In fact, the purpose of
this lawsuit appears to have been aimed at increasing the High School's
endowment, rather than addressing some purported injury. The Woodlands
Business Park Association has been maintaining and plowing the right of way for
years, although the record evidence is that many of those who use the right of way
are high school students and local residents, not Tract B tenants. The record does
not suggest that the Easement is overburdened with vehicles or that the High
School has suffered any injury. A forfeiture of the easement is simply not
warranted.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Tract B Property Owners respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the district court's order.
DATED this
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801)531-8900
Facsimile: (801) 531-1716
Attorneys for Defendants Woodlands III Holdings, LLC; Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC;
JDJ Pioperties, Inc.; and The Woodlands Business Park Association
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL
ASSOCIATION OF THE GREATER SALT
LAKE AREA, a Utah non-profit corporation,
dba SALT LAKE LUTHERAN HIGH
SCHOOL,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]

WOODLANDS III HOLDINGS, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company;
WOODLANDS IV HOLDINGS, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company; BEDFORD
PROPERTY INVESTORS, INC., a
Maryland corporation; JDJ PROPERTIES,
INC., a Utah corporation; THE
WOODLANDS BUSINESS PARK
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit
corporation; WASATCH PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corporation;
and JOHN DOES 1-1,000,
Defendants.
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)
]
)1 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
)1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
]1 AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
>
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)

;
;
)
;
)
;

Civil No. 960908063 PR
Judge Sandra N. Peuler

Defendants, Woodlands III Holdings, LLC, JDJ Properties, Inc., and The Woodlands
Business Park Association, filed their Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Motion For
Summary Judgment") on or about September 25, 2001. Plaintiff thereafter filed its
Supplemental Complaint on or about February 8, 2002, joining Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC, as
a defendant. On or about March 25, 2002, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.
Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC, joined in the motion papers in support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The
motions were fully briefed by the parties and submitted to the court for decision, accompanied by
a request for oral argument. Both motions came on for hearing before the Honorable Sandra N.
Peuler on April 22, 2002, at 10:00 a.m. The moving Defendants were represented by P. Bruce
Badger and Matthew L. Anderson of Fabian & Clendenin. Plaintiff was represented by Stephen
F. Hutchinson of Taylor, Adams, Lowe & Hutchinson. Defendant Bedford Property Investors,
Inc., was represented by Ronald G. Russell of Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless
The court heard argument of counsel and having fully considered the parties' respective
moving papers, including affidavits supporting and opposing the motions, and being otherwise
fully advised, now enters its order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for the reasons set forth in

the Minute Entry dated April 26, 2002 (attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein
by this reference) and as set forth in Defendants' memoranda filed in support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.
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2.

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied for the reasons set forth in the

Minute Entry (Exhibit "A" hereto) and as set forth in Defendants' memorandum opposing
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
3.

This action involves a non-exclusive easement (the "Easement") appurtenant to

and across a parcel of property located in Salt Lake County which is currently owned by the Salt
Lake Lutheran High School. The Easement runs west from 900 East at approximately 4000
South and was granted for the purpose of providing vehicular access to a portion of what is now
the Woodlands Business Park located on 700 East. The Easement was created by a Declaration
of Easements, Covenants and Restrictions (the " 1983 Declaration"), which was recorded in the
records of the Salt Lake County Recorder on October 27, 1983, as Entry 3862259, Book 5502,
Page 1559. The legal descriptions that were attached as exhibits to the 1983 Declaration were
reversed, so an Amendment to Declaration of Easements, Covenants and Restrictions (the " 1984
Declaration") was recorded on June 20, 1984, as Entry 3957731, Book 5566, Page 2146, to
correctly set forth the legal descriptions of the affected parcels. The Easement is referred to in
the 1983 Declaration as the "Associates Roadway". The servient estate with respect to the
Easement or the Associates Roadway is referred to as Tract A in the 1983 Declaration, and is
more particularly described in Exhibit "B" hereto. The dominant estate with respect to the
Easement or the Associates Roadway is referred to as Tract B in the 1983 Declaration, and is
more particularly described in Exhibit "C" hereto.
4.

Since the grant of the Easement, the Woodlands Business Park has expanded to

property north of the dominant estate that the parties to this action have referred to variously as
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Tract C, or the "Northern Parcel" or "Expansion Property", which is more particularly described
in Exhibit "D" hereto. Tract C contains both a high-rise office building ("Tower IV") owned by
Woodlands IV Holdings LLC, and a multi-level parking facility.
5.

The Easement, which is for the benefit of the dominant estate, has not been

overburdened by the use of the Easement by the owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires
of Tract B and their customers, invitees and guests, including their use of the Easement to access
parking on Tract C.
6.

The owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires of Tract B and their

customers, invitees and guests, may continue to use the Easement to access parking on Tract C.
7.

The owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires of Tract C and their

customers, invitees and guests, may not use the Easement. Accordingly, Woodlands IV
Holdings, LLC, shall take all steps necessary to restrict use of the Easement by the Tower IV
tenants, subtenants and concessionaires and their customers, invitees and guests, including
notifying them, restricting access as part of the lease agreements, and such other steps as may be
appropriate.
8.

This Order is an adjudication of all of the claims in this action notwithstanding

that Wasatch Properties Management, Inc., was joined as a defendant and has never appeared.
Accordingly, the court expressly determines that there is no just reason to delay entry of final
judgment and expressly directs entry of this Order as Final Judgment.
9.

Any person may record a certified copy of this Order in the official records

of the Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The recording of this Order shall serve

to immediately release the Lis Pendens recorded in the records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder on November 21,1996, as Entry 6511599, Book 7540, Page 10, which referenced
the real property described in Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" hereto.
DATED this *\

day of

^l^^rvOUc^^

, 2002.

Approved as to form:

Robert M. Taylor
Stephen F. Hutchinson
Sue J. Chon
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the [**'

day of August, 2002,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Proposed Order Granting Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment by hand delivering said
document as follows:
Robert M. Taylor
Sue J. Chon
Taylor, Adams, Lowe & Hutchinson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Ronald G. Russell
Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless
Attorneys for Bedford Property Investors, Inc.
185 South State, #1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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EXHIBIT
"A"

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL
ASSOCIATION OF THE GREATER
SALT LAKE AREA, a Utah nonprofit corporation, dba SALT
LAKE LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 960908063
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER

Plaintiff,
vs.
WOODLANDS III HOLDINGS LLC, a
Utah limited liability
company, et. al.
Defendants.

j

This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross Motions
for Summary Judgment. Oral arguments were held on April 22, 2002.
Following the conclusion of the hearing, the 'Court took the matter
under advisement.

Now, having fully considered the arguments of

counsel, submissions of the parties and the applicable legal
authority the Court enters the following ruling.
The relevant facts are as follows.

In October 1983 Woodland

Investment Company ("Woodland") owned the parcel of land located at
4020 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah ("Tract A") and Woodland
Associates ("Associates") owned the land located directly west of
Tract A ("Tract B") . On October 27th, 1983 Woodland and Associates
entered

into

Restrictions"

a

"Declaration

of

Easements

Covenants

and

(the "1983 Declaration") under which the parties

provided for: (1) an easement over Tract A which provided access to
Tract B from 900 East;

and (2) an easement over Tract B which
t I -I
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provided access to Tract A from 700 East.
the

Declaration

evidences

the

clear

The language of

intent

that both tracks would be commercial in nature.
B

developed

commercially

and currently

of

was

sold

in

19S2 to

the

a parking

(f,Towers I, II and

III"), open parking areas and two retail centers.
hand,

partise

Eventually, Tract

contains:

facility, three high rise office buildings

other

the

Tract A, on the

Lutheran

High

School

Association ("Plaintiff").
The current dispute revolves around a contiguous parcel of
land owned by Woodlands IV and located immediately north of Tract
B ("Tract C") . Tract C is an expansion of the original development
and contains both a high rise office building ("Tower IV") and a
multi level parking facility.

Currently, Tract B tenants, working

at Tower III, are permitted to use Tract C's parking facility.

In

order to reach the parking facility, Tract B workers use the
easement over Tract A.

Plaintiff objects to this use of the

easement by claiming that it overburdens the easement in conflict
with the original intention of the parties.
As an initial matter, both parties agree that the benefit
of

the

easement

may

not

be

enlarged

to

include

Track

C.

Therefore, the tenants of Tower IV, located on Tract C, may not
use the easement to access that property,

Accordingly, defendants

are ordered to take all necessary steps to restrict use of the

LUTHERAN HIGH V
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easement by Tower IV tenants, including notifying them, restricting
access as part of the lease agreements, and such other steps as may
be appropriate.
As to the remaining issue, the Court concludes that the
easement is not overburdened by the Tract B tenants' use of the
easement to access parking on Tract C.
Generally, the holder of an easement is entitled to use that
easement in a banner "reasonably necessary for the convenient
enjoyment of the servitude." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES)
§4.10 (2000).

Additionally, the terms 1983 Declaration indicate

that this easement was specifically designed for the "benefit" of
the parties and their tenants. (Declaration of Easements Covenants
and Restrictions Sec. 4 H d).

Here, the tenants of Tract B, for

whom the easement was originally intended, make no greater use of
the easement by parking on Tract C, than they would if they parked
on Tract B; there is no evidence that the parking arrangement
causes any additional vehicle traffic.

In addition, although

plaintiffs argued that the parking arrangement makes Tract C a
beneficiary of the easement, there is no evidence in the record to
support that. Rather, it appears that the tenants of Tract B only
use the easement for the benefit and enjoyment of the servitude to
which they are entitled.
Accordingly,

defendants' Motion

for

Summary

Judgment is

LUTHERAN HIGH V
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granted, and plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Defendants' counsel is directed to prepare an Order consistent
with this Minute Entry and submit the same to the Court for review
and signature.

Dated this

day of April, 2002

BY THE COURT:

SANDRA N. PEULER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 960908063 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this fcp day of

A

NAME
MATTHEW L. ANDERSON
ATTORNEY DEF
215 South State St. Suite
1200
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, UT 84151
STEPHEN F HUTCHINSON
ATTORNEY PLA
2180 SOUTH 1300 EAST
SUITE 520
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841060000
RONALD G RUSSELL
ATTORNEY DEF
185 SOUTH STATE STE 1300
PO BOX 11019
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841470019
20/ /

EXHIBIT
"B"

EXHIBIT B

The following real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah:
TRACT I

Sidwell No.: 16-32-376-047

Commencing 145.67 feet Southfromthe Northeast corner of Lot 12, Block 5, Ten Acre
Plat A, Big Field Survey; thence South 237.13 feet; West 379.5 feet; North 0°06'10" East
383 feet; East 229.5 feet; South 145.67 feet; East 150 feet to BEGINNING. 2.82 acres.
TRACT n

Sidwell No.: 16-32-376-026

Commencing North 0°04' East 168.2 feet from the Southeast corner of Lot 12, Block 5,
Ten Acre Plat A, Big Field Survey; thence North 0°04' East 23.2 feet; West 23 rods
South 0°04' West 23.2 feet; East 23 rods to BEGINNING 0.2 acres.
TRACT III

Sidwell No.: 16-32-376-044

Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 11, Block 5, Ten Acre Plat "A", Big Field
Survey; thence West 766.09 feet; North 327.21 feet; East 766.09 feet; South 327.21 feet
to BEGINNING.
The foregoing notwithstanding Tracts I and II shall be benefited by the Woodland
Easement only so long as its use is limited to use for apartment purposes.

EXHIBIT
"C"

EXHIBIT C

SidwellNos.: 16-32-352-051
16-32-352-057
16-32-352-058
16-32-352-059
16-32-352-060
16-32-352-061
16-32-352-062
16-32-352-063

BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block 5, Ten Acre Plot
"A", Big Field Survey; and running thence south 0°09'59" West 572.84
feet to the Southeast corner of said Lot 8, thence South 0°09'59" West
19.83 feet to the South line of Lot 14A, CLEARVIEW ACRES
SUBDIVISION; thence South 89°55' West 106.51 feet to the Southeast
comer of Lot 15A; thence North 88°50'40" West 100.01 feet to the
Southeast corner of Lot 16A; thence North 89°52'30" West 100.00 feet to
the Southeast corner of Lot 17A; thence North 89°59'27" West 100.00 feet
to the Southeast corner of Lot 18 A; thence North 88°23'10" West 100.03
feet to the Southeast corner of Lot 19A; thence North 89°01' West 100.01
feet to the Southeast corner of Lot 20A; thence North 87°39'20" West
160.11 feet to the Southwest corner of said Lot 20A, CLEARVIEW
ACRES SUBDIVISION; thence North 0°14' 13" East 6.78 feet to the
Southwest corner of said Lot 8; Block 5, Ten Acre Plat "A"; thence North
0°14' 13" East 573.07 feet to the Northwest corner of said Lot 8; thence
South 89°58'24" East 89.30 feet; thence along the arc of a 622.03 foot
radius curve to the right 715.24 feet to the point of BEGINNING, said arc
being subtended by a chord of South 89°58'24" East 676.48 feet.

EXHIBIT
"D"

EXHIBIT D

Real Property situated in Salt Lake County, Utah, described as follows:
SidwellNo.: 16-32-352-011
Commencing 352.1 feet South from the Northwest corner of Lot 9, Block 5, Ten Acre
Plat "A", Big Field Survey, and running thence East 150 feet; thence South 65 feet;
thence West 150 feet; thence North 65 feet to the point of beginning.

SidwellNo.: 16-32-352-012
Commencing 50 feet North from the Southwest corner of Lot 9, Block 5, Ten Acre Plat
"A", Big Field Survey, and running thence East 150 feet; thence North 50 feet; thence
West 150 feet; thence South 50 feet to the point of beginning.

SidwellNo.: 16-32-352-013
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 9, Block 5, Ten Acre Plat "A", Big Field
Survey, and running thence West along a 622.03 foot radius curve 715.24 feet, (said arc
being subtended by a chord of South 89 degrees 59' East 676.48 feet) thence West 82.52
feet; thence North 50 feet; thence East 150 feet; thence North 50 feet; thence West 150
feet; thence North 56.52 feet; thence East 150 feet; thence North 130.58 feet; thence East
389 feet; thence South 13 feet; thence South 85 degrees 34' East 220.6 feet; thence South
257.1 feet to the point of beginning.
THE AFORESAID PARCELS ARE FURTHER DESCRIBED BY ALTA/ACSM
SURVEY AS FOLLOWS:
WES r PARCEL - NORTH AREA WOODLANDS BUSINESS PARK
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner of Lot 9, Block 5, 10 Acre Plat "A", Big Field
Survey and running thence North 0 degrees 14'13" East along the East line of 700 East
Street 220.97 feet; thence South 89 degrees 57'56" East 150.00; feet; thence North 0
degrees 13*23" East 65.00 feet; thence South 89 degrees 5738" East 110.00 feet; thence
South 0 degrees 02'22" West 208.635 feet to a point on a curve to the left; the radius
point of which bears South 15 degrees 30'15" East 622.03 feet; thence Southwesterly
along the arc of said curve 189.008 feet; thence North 89 degrees 58'24" West 89.30 feet
to the point of BEGINNING.

Exhibit D (con't)
EAST PARCEL - NORTH AREA WOODLANDS BUSINESS PARK
BEGINNING at a point North 0 degrees 14' 13" East along the East line of 700 East
Street 220.97 feet and South 89 degrees 51'36" East 150.00 feet and North 0 degrees
13*23" East 65.00 feet, and South 89 degrees 57'38" East 110.00 feet from the Southwest
corner of Lot 9, Block 5,10 Acre Plat "A" Big Field Survey and running thence South 89
degrees 57'38" East 285.26 feet; thence South 0 degrees 11 '14" West 17.30 feet; thence
South 85 degrees 34'00" East 220.80 feet; thence South 0 degrees 09'59" West 251.59
feet to the Southeast corner of Lot 9, Block 5,10 Acre Plat "A", Big Field Survey, said
point also being on a curve to the left, the radius point of which bears South 32 degrees
58'02" West 622.03 feet; thence Westerly along the arc of said curve 526.228 feet;
thence North 0 degrees 02'22" East 208.635 feet to the point of BEGINNING.
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DECLARATION OF EASEKENTS,
COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS
THIS DECLARATION (the "Declaration11) is. made and*".
entered into thio a 1 day of OcniVag/a,
; 1983} b y arid
between WOODLAND INVESTMENT Co., a Utah limited partnership.
1"Woodland"), and THE WOODLANDS ASSOCIATES, a joint venture
organized purouanfc *"* ••he Utah Uniform Partnerohip Act
("Associates"),
RECITALS
A, Woodland ovno a tract of real property ("Tract.A")
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the legal dcocription
of wh5ch io oec forth on Exhibit "A."
B, .Asoociatea, contemporaneously with.the execution
of thio Declaration, io acquiring a tract of real, property;« ,'«
("Tract D") located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, tho .legal
description of which io oet forth on Exhibit "B."
C,
The portico" dcoiro to t create certain croao
eaoencnto and righto between and inpooo cortain covenanto end
rcotriction on Tracto A and B.
7"~RE?0RE, "for TEN DOLLARS'($10.00)'and otnor ftood'anu""
valuable cokoideration, tho receipt and oufficioncy of which ara
hereby acknowledged, the partioo agreoao follovoi'

!•

Definitions.

An used in thia Declaration!

(a) "Party" mcano each pcroon executing thi8
inotrument and ito hciro, aooigno and oucr.caaorc in interact with
respect to Tract A or Tract D, ao the ca<ic may be, ao the some
may be ohovm by the records of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
as of the date of the cxerciae of powers granted hereunder or the
performance of or failure of performance by such Partiea of the
obligations created by thia Declaration. Without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, the term Party rcfera to the pcraona
vho fit the following claoaificacionoi
(i) .The peraon or persona holding fee title
to all or any portion of Tract A or Trace Bj and
(ii) The Iccoce or leeeeeo under a ground
lease of all or a portion of any Tract for a fixed minimum term
of thirty (30) yearn, or longer, in which event the^fee owner of
the real property covered by euch leoee will not be"deemed to be
a Party aa to ouch Tract or portion of such Tract" for the
urpoaes of thic Declaration during the duration of such ground
eaoe.

I

(b) •'Partiea" ceano every person w h o i o a Party,
taken in the aggregate.
2.

Coven an tS'" and Restrictions with Re8pect to Tract

JB.
(a) No party ohall attempt to obtain or consent
to any change or variance in toning of Tract B if ouch change
would jeopardize the right of Woodland, ito succeaooro and.*
aooigno, to retain and maintain- any oign described in Section 3
of this Declaration.
(b> The official nacc^of any building' complex
located on Tract D will- contain. tho -word "Woodland11 or
"Woodlando11 unleoo tho": use of oucn word ia not permitted by.
applicable lawo,.rcgulationu or ordinances The owner of Truce B
ohall have the righc to relieve Tract B of tho obligation impoaed
by thio Section 2(b) by pay inn to the owner of Tract A, in a lump
oum, tho amount of $100,000 for tho oxpreoo and eola purpooa of
obtaining nuch ralief,
(c) Ho part of Tract" B'*shall, tor'"a period of
ti/onty-fivo (25) yoaro toll owing, tha-'deia of'thia Daclarocion, be
uood ao a-Thoator-IlaGtaurantr.providcd,.; that.thia-restriction

ohall be void i f no Theater-Restaurant io operated on Tract A for
a continuous period of sixty (60) monthB. For purposea of this
Section 2(c), the tern "Theater-Restaurant" ahail mean a public
or private dining f a c i l i t y , operated for profit, having 20 or
more tables, where l i v e vocal, theatrical or comedy entertainment
iB regularly provided.
(d) If construction of a Health Club on Tract A
i s coamenced before the latter of one (1) year from the date of
thio Drclaration or nine (9) tnontho after the commencement of
conctruction of the f ^ r t building on Tract B, then for ao long
as such Health Club i e completed within a reasonable time and
continuously available to tne Parties with respect to Tract B and
a l l tenatita of auch Parties and a l l of the personnel of such
tenants, at pricca competitive with or l e s s than those beinc
charged by Health Clubs open to the general public, no Health
Club w i l l be operated on Tract B or directly or indirectly by
Asaociateo (but no*, i t o successors) within a radiuo of 5/8's of a
n i l e of Tract A. For purposes of this Section 2(d), the term
•'Health Club" chall wean a public or private facility containing
a jogging f a c i l i t y , exercise and weight room, a sauna, swimming
pool, tennis or racquetball court, a Jacuzzi or similar
significant exercioc f a c i l i t y .
3. Signs on Tract B. Subject to the limitations set
forth below, AooociAces granca to Woodland the right to erect and
operate on Tract B, at any time and from time to timo, one
free-otanding doublc-cided sign (the "Woodland Sign"), which may
be a "pylon" oign. The deoign and operation of the Woodland Sign
chall comply with the following conditions*
(n) Any Woodland Sign may be electrically-lighted
and may display lighted, electronically activated messages. The
dimenoiono, height and otyle of any woodland Sign shall bo .
designated by woodland but chall be oubject to the approval of a
licenced building architect. Such architect shall bo chosen by
the Party owning Tract B from a l i o t of three licenoed,building
architects oelected by Woodland, Tho face or faces of any
Woodland Sign shall be located within a square or rectangle, and
said oquaro or rectangle shall not exceed 275 squaro fact per
Gide.

o,

(b) Any Woodland Sign ohall ba eroctod on a
p o r e d of land located in tho Scuthwcot corner of Tract B and
described on Exhibit "C" (tho "Woodland Sign Location"). To the

on
^£1
^

extent fcaoible the Woodland Sign ohall ba located on the
couthern ten (10) feet of the Woodland Sign Location. The
Woodland Sign cay be altered or replaced from time to time as
long aa the alteration or replacement complies with the
limitationn oet forth in this Section 3.
(c) The Woodland Sign nay not be used to
advertioe or refer in any way to an office or officca for rent.
.4

(d) The dcaign and operation of any Woodland Sign
will comply with all applicable lawo, ordinances and regulations,
(e) Woodland, at its cost and expenoe, shall
maintain any Woodland Sign in good and cafe operating condition.
If Woodland fails to maintain any Woodland Sign, then, on one
hundred eighty (100) dayo' written notice to .Woodland, Associates
nay either cauoe cuch maintenance to be performed or have tha
sign removed and ahall have a lien on Tract A for the amount
expended in maintaining (but not removing) any Woodland Sign;
plus interest at the rate of twelve percent (12X) per annua from
the date of such expenditure.
(f) Notwithstanding any other provioion contained
in thio Section 3, the right of Woodland and its aucccssoro and*
assigns to erect any Woodland Sign and to.posoesa the Woodland
Sign Location chall be extinguiohed if ouch oign is not erected
within five (5) years of the date hereof or it such oign, onco
erected, ia abandoned for a continuous period of ona (1) year
thereafter.
(g) Woodland ond each pcroo'n constituting a Part?
with respect to Tract A ohall -indemnify, defend and nold.
Asoociacco an<* csch pcroon constituting a Party with respect tc
Tract B harmless fron and against any and all liabilities*'
losses, actiono, proceedings, judgmento, controversiest claimsj
coots or expeneca (including cttomevo 1 fceo) arising out of the
design, use or operation of any Woodland Sign.
(h) Ho right granted to Woodland by this Section
3 chall limit or rcctrict in cny way the right of Associates to
erect and operate (or permit to be erected aud operated) oigno on
Tract B.
'

S
&

(i) Aoaociaceo may place on Tract A a sign Advertising
the office project to be located on Tract B. Such sign may
remain until April 30, 1984.
4.

Grant of Easement.

(a) Woodland granto to Associates a nonexclusive
easement appurrenant to and acroao Trace A for the purpose of
allowing vehicular acceos between the public streets ana any and
all parfcing arcno or roadwayo and laneo aituated on Tract Bj
provided, that the foregoing right of acceoo oholl be liciitcd to
use for such purpoaes and to auch extent ao may be cuatonary for
uce of Tract B for commercial purpoaeo (including! but not
limited to, reasonable and customary deliveries)* -.The eASement
granted by thia subsection (a) ahall be United to the zondvay '
described on Exhibit M D " <tho "Asoociateo Roadway11) < At any time
before December 31, 1903, by giving written notice to Aoeociates.
Woodland may relocate the Aooociatco Roadway up to twenty-five
(25) feet to the north or oouth of the cente'rlinc of the
Asoociateo Roadway ae deocribed on Exhibit "D." Thereafter,
Woodlend ehnll not move or relocate the Aoaociatee Roadway, In
addition to the foregoing, Aaaocioteo ahall have the right to
elevate or Gink the western twenty (20) feet of tho Associates
Roadway in order to align the oame with the upper and/or lower
decka of a parking ramp. On or before Novcmner ~30 j 1984
Woodland agrceo to conotruct a paved roadway twenty-five (25)feet wide on the Aaoociateo Roadway in accordanco. with good
construction practices*
<b) Associates granto to Woodland a honoKcluolve
casement oppurtenant to end acrooo Tract B for tha purpooc of
allowing vehicular acccao between the public otrecto ana any and
all parking creao oituoted on Tract Ai 'The casement granted by
thio ouboection (b) ahall be limited to tho roadway deocribed on
Exhibit "E" (tho "Woodland Roadway11),-. In addition AsoociatOQ
ahall provide a twenty-five (25) toot two-way access lane;from
the Woodland Roadway to the Aooociate3 Roadway in ouch ..location
as Asoociateo nay designate (tho "Connecting Roadway").'- At any
time before December 31, 1983».by giving written notico-.to-.
Woodland, Aaoociateo nay relocato tho Woodland Roadway u£ to
twenty-fivo (25) feet to tho north or oouch of the centerlina of
the Woodland Roadway ao described on Exhibit uEi". Thereafter
Asoociateo ahall not move or relocato the Woodland'Roadway» . On
or before June 30, 1985 Aocociateo agrceo to contruct a paved
roadway tvency-five (25) feet wido on the Woodland. Roadway and

e*
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che Connecting Roadway in accordance with good construction
practices. The foregoing notwithstanding the easements granted
over the Woodland Roadway and che Connecting Roadway ahall be
subject to the following conditional
(i) The easement for the Connecting Roadway
i s limited to oeven (7) feet in hcightj
( i i ) The easements far the Woodland Roadway
and the Connecting Roadway arc United to use for cuch purpoaea
and to auch extent ec may be customary for uac of Tract A for
commercial purpoaea (including, but not United to, reasonable
and customary 'deliveries consistent vith the foregoing height
r e s t r i c t i o n ) and to erect and maintain any Woodland Signi
(iii)
A parking ramo or any similar
otructure cay be constructed on Tract B except over the Woodland
Roadway, and Aooociatea may route all traffic using the
Connecting Roadway through euch structure on the upper and/or the
lower deck of any ouch ocructurcj and
(iv) The location of the Connecting Roadway
may be altered, relocated or changed in any Banner and at any
cirar and from time to timo without the prior written conoent of
Woodland upon oixty (60) dayo1 prior written'notice.to Woodland.
(c) The Parties agree to keep and maintain at ito
sole cost and expenca tha roadways located on ito Tract in good
condition. If a Party f a i l s to oo keep and maintain tho roadway
for which i t is Responsible, or to construct tho same, the other
Party may on thirty (30) dayo written notico to perform ouch,
maintenance and/or construction and the performing party shall
have G l i e n on tho Tract owned by tho defaulting Party.for tha:
amount expended pluo intcreot at the rato of twelve percent (12l)
per annum from tnc date of ouch expenditure.
(d) Tho caoomenta granted pursuant to this
Section 4 ohall benefit each of tha Portico and thair reopectivo
tononto, concessionaires, cuotoccroi inviteeo and gucafco, and tha
concessionaire, inviteeo, cuotomoro and gucoto of an?-tenant or
subtenant of th« reopectivo Portico,

g

5. Durotlon. Thio Declaration and csch easement,
covenant, restriction and undertaking of this Declaration shall

~*
a

be for a term of ninccy-nina (99) ycaro unless sooner terminated
pursuant to Section 2,
6.
Hodificntlon, Thio Declcration and any eaoement,
covenant, r c o t r i c c i o n or undertaking contained h e r e i n may be
.terminated, extended, c o d i f i e d or amended as to the whole of the
Tracts of any portion of then, v i t h the unanimous*, concent, of the
Tartiea.
7

«
Hot a PuSlic D e d i c a t i o n , Nothing '.contained i n
t h i o Declaration w i l l be deemed to bo a g i f t or a^dedicotion of
any portion of e i t h e r Tract to the general public or for the
g e n e r a l public or f o r ony public purpose whatoocver, i t being the
i n t e n t of the Partiea that thio Declaration be s t r i c t l y limited
t o and for the purpose expressed h e r e i n ,
fi.

Mutuality^ Denetito one Burdens Run v i t h Landi

(a) Each and a l l or the easements* covenants,
r e o t r i c t i o n o , right3 and p r o v i s i o n s granted or created horein are
appurtcnancca to the Tracta and none of the eaoemonto,'covenants,
r e s t r i c t i o n s , righto and provioiono may be transferred, assigned,*
or encumbered except ao an appurtenance to fluch Tracto. For the
purposeo of the easementa, covenants, r e s t r i c t i o n s , r i g h t s and
p r o v i s i o n s created by t h i s D e c l a r a t i o n , the Tract benefited w i l l
c o n s t i t u t e tho dominant e s t a t e , and the Tract burdehod by such
teseaicnta, covenants, r e s t r i c t i o n s , r i g h t s and p r o v i s i o n s v i l l
c o n s t i t u t e tho s e r v i e n t . e s t s t o .
(b) Each-and a l l of the cascccnto, covenants,,
r e s t r i c t i o n s , c o n d i t i o n s , r i g h t s and provisions contained i n t h i s
Declaration (whether affirmotivo or negative in nature) are madoj,f o r the direct:, nutuel and r e c i p r o c a l benefit of each Tractj v i l l
c r e a t e mutusl. c o u i t a b l c oervitudca upon each Tract running v i t h
the landi v i l l t i n d and inure t o tho benefit of every person,
having any f e e , ' l e a s e h o l d , ' o r other i n t o r e o t i n any portion-.of
the Tracts at any t i n e or from t i n o t o time to tho oxtont that
ouch portion i o a f f e c t e d or bound by the caocnont,., covenant,*;
r e s t r i c t i o n , right o r . p r o v i s i o n i n qucotion, .or t h a t tho..casan c n t , covenant, r e s t r i c t i o n , r i a n t or provision • i o ; to be
g
performed on ouch portioni and w i l l bind and inuro to tho benefit £h
of the Portico.and t h e i r reopectivo heiro,*ouccooooro and aosirmfi en
no t o t h e i r rcoDcctiva Tracts:
C

9.

Miscellaneous Provisions.

(a) . The Parties do not by this Declaration, in
any way or for any purpose, become partners or joint venturers of
each other in the conduct of their resoective businessea or
otherwise.
(b) Each Party ohall be excused for the period of
any delay in the* performance of any obligations .hereunder when
prevented
from timely performing*by a cause or-cauoeo beyond auch
Party ! s control, including labor disputco, c i v i l .Commotion, war,
governmental rogulationo, moratorium or controlai fire or other
casualty, inability to obtain.any material or oervices*, or acta
of Cod. •
(c) Failure of a Party to inolotjupon the atrict
performance of any proviaion or to exercise any option hereunder
shall not.be construed aa a waiver for-future purposes with
rccpect to an7 «uch proviaion or option. ' Ho proviaion of this
Declaration ahc.ll be deemed to have .been'waived unleoo such
waiver io in writing and.oignc.d by. tho'Party alleged to havo
waived ita righta.
If,. any provision of thio Declaration or tho
m • .--(d)
application thereof to / any poroon/or circunotanco ohall* to'any
extent be invalid, .tho remainder .of m thio Declaration of the
application of ouch'provision to fccroono or-circurietancco other
than those ao to which, i t io held invalid'shall, not be. affected
thereby and cnch provision of this Declaration ohail be'valid; and
enforced to the f u l l e s t extent permitted by law,
(e) Exccph ao" othcrwiao" provided j \"all* provisions
herein ohall be binding upon-end ohall inur a- to. the. benefit ..of .
the Partieo*, their legal reprcocntativea*-; heirs i^Bucceoooro and'
assigns*
(f) Each person- executing' thio•Daclaration"fbr.;an
entity rcpreaents and warranto \ that* he i o . duly -..'authorized* to
executo and deliver the camcon behalf .of. tho .entity .for. which'he
io oignlng (whether i t . b o - a corporation!, general 'or-linitod%Jf]'
partnership or otherwise), and that thio Declaration- is' binding
upon ouch entity in accordance with;, i t a .terns,

(g) This Declaration shall ba cons trued • in
accordance vith the laws of tho State of Utah.
(h) All exhibito referred to in thio Declaration,
are hereby incorporated by reference,
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, tho pfirtieo hereto have executed
this Declaration ori the: day and year first O C L forth above;
"WOODLAND"i
VOODtAHD INVESTMENT CO,, a Utah
limited partnership

''ASSOCIATES"
tHE 'WOODLAfiDS'-ASSOClATESV a
joint venture organised under
the Utah .Uniform Partnership <
Act by ita.twoi Venturerst/«*:.;
tMP VoODU*&S ,'• LTD",- i";i ti talv :
limitod partnershipi by ; its
oolo general partner* KHC . .;
PROPERTIES! INCi^axUtah'-*?
corporation* • *. ^;KrV;>- "3

M

(MUA
\/*Zr\ n

SLC-1 LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a
Wiaconoin U n i t e d partnershipi
by i t a oole general partner
JOHNSON V7AX DEVELOPHENT
CORPORATION, a Wisconsin
corporation

Its"

STATE OF
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PROPERTIES, INCi f- a • Utah' corporation which £0 the general.-«*V
partner of MHP-Woodlandoi ttd % l -a Utah limited pafctnarohipi fchich,
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Planning Commission
November 22, 1983

The applicant was not present.
the application present.

-3-

There was no one else for or against

By motion, seconded, the Planning Commission unanimously continued the
application until December 2 0, 1983.
fPL-83-3013 - THE WOODLAND ASSOC. - 4405 SOUTH 700 EAST OFFICE/COMMERCIAL COMPLEX - ZONE C-2 - (MILLCREEK)
This project was given conteptual approval previously. They have
ref iled as a PUD to allow a variance in the height requirements of the
buildings. They are proposing the north retail building to be two
stories a bank building on the south corner of the project. The south
office tower will be 5 stories, the middle one 8 stories, and the tower
to the north 12 stories in height. There will be a multi-level
parking structure east of the high rises which will be four levels high
at the highest point. The staff recommended approval subject to the
conditions on file.
John Hampshire, representing the applicant, .stated all the retail
facility and the center 8 story tower building will be Phase I. The
bank could be developed at anytime during the first phase. Basically
they will construct the plateau and plaza level including all the front
landscaping as part of the first phase. The 5 story tower would be
Phase II, and the 12 story as the last phase. The completion date for
the entire project being approximately four years.
There was no one else present for or against the application.
By motion, seconded, the Planning Commission unanimously approved the
staff recommendation, subject to the following conditions:
1. Staff review of the plans.
2. Receiving other recommendations
3. Submitting the drawings required by the PUD ordinance.
4. Showing the phasing.
#PL-83-2203 - CHARLOTTE MOLNAR - 237 WEST 3680 SOUTH - ALCHOHOL
RECOVERY - ZONE M-l - (MILLCREEK)
This is a request to allow a quasi-public use of an alcho'hol recovery
unit. The staff recommended approval subject to the conditions on file.
Louise Clawson, representing the applicant, stated they will have
maximum capacity of 40 people, who will be supervised 24 hours a day.
The residents will be transported to work, and will not be allowed to
drive their own cars. The average length of stay will be 90 days. The
maximum length of stay would be 6 months. The residents are not a
court order or criminal clientel. If approval is given, they
anticipate being there 3 years. There will be three staff members on
the premises all the time, however, there will be other staff members
there during the day. The building will not be changed drastically
making it possible to return it to an industrial use if this facility
does not stay at this location.
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P. Bruce Badger (A4791)
Diane H. Banks (A4966)
Matthew L. Anderson (A7459)
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
215 South State Street, 12th Floor
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801) 531-8900
Facsimile: (801)531-1716
Attorneys for Defendants Woodlands III Holdings, LLC; JDJ Properties, Inc.; and
The Woodlands Business Park Association
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL
)
ASSOCIATION OF THE GREATER SALT )
LAKE AREA, a Utah non-profit corporation, )
dba SALT LAKE LUTHERAN HIGH
)
SCHOOL,
)
Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN A. DAHLSTROPI, JR.

)
)

WOODLANDS III HOLDINGS, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company, BEDFORD
PROPERTY INVESTORS, INC., a
Maryland corporation, JDJ PROPERTIES,
INC., a Utah corporation, THE
WOODLANDS BUSINESS PARK
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit
corporation, WASATCH PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corporation,
and JOHN DOES 1-1,000,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 960908063 PR
Judge Sandra N. Peuler

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
John A. Dahlstrom, Jr., having been duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Utah.

2.

I am Executive Vice President, General Counsel of Wasatch Property

Management, Inc., which is under contract to manage the Woodlands Business Park, located at
approximately 4000 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
3.

Office Tower 1 at the Woodlands Business Park is eight (8) stories in height and

is owned by JDJ Properties, Inc., a Utah corporation.
4.

Office Tower 2 at the Woodlands Business Park is six (6) stories in height and is

owned by Woodlands III Holdings, LLC, a Utah limited liability company.
5.

Office Tower 3 at the Woodlands Business Park is four (4) stories in height and is

owned by Woodlands III Holdings, LLC.
6-

Office Tower 4 at the Woodlands Business Park is not owned by any of the

Defendants named in this lawsuit.
7.

There are also two retail buildings at the Woodlands Business Park; one is owned

by JDJ Properties, Inc., the other is owned by Woodlands III Holdings, LLC.
8.

The tenants and customers of the retail space and Office Towers I, II and III park

in two parking structures. One parking stmcture with 2 levels, situated immediately east of the
three office towers, is owned by the Woodlands Business Park Association, a Utah non-profit
coiporation. The second parking structure with 3 levels is situated northeast of Office Tower III,
abutting the roadway within the Woodlands Business Park. Access to the parking

228806-1
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structure which is situated northeast of Office Tower III is via 700 East, 3900 South or the rightof-way from 900 East along tlie north boundary of tlie Lutheran High School property.
9.

An accurate photograph of the right-of-way on the Lutheran High School

Property leading to the parking structure situated, to tlie east of Office Towers 1, II and III is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
10,

An accurate photograph of the parking .structure situated to the northeast of Of6.ce

Tower HI is attached as Exhibit "B".
Further affiant sayeth not.
DATED this

of September, 2001.

'ahlstrom, Jr.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before m^o^his / f ^ _ d a y of September 2001.
NOTARY PUMJC
REBECCA F. HICKS
8661 South 1700 E«tf
Sandy, UT 64003
My Commission ExptaM
January 10,2004
STATE OF UTAH

32M06-I
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)TARY PUBLIC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the . ^ p 7 - ' day of September, 2001,1 hereby certify that I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. DALHSTROM, JR., ESQ. by depositing
said document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Robert M. Taylor
Sue J. Chon
TAYLOR, ADAMS, LOWE & HUTCHINSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

UiniAJth £ /
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EXHIBIT "A"
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Exhibit "B"
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P. Bruce Badger (A4791)
Diane H. Banks (A4966)
Matthew L. Anderson (A7459)
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
215 South State Street, 12th Floor
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801)531-8900
Facsimile: (801)531-1716
Attorneys for Defendants Woodlands III Holdings, LLC; Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC; JDJ
Properties, Inc.; and The Woodlands Business Park Association
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL
;
ASSOCIATION OF THE GREATER SALT ;
LAKE AREA, a Utah non-profit corporation, ])
dba SALT LAKE LUTHERAN HIGH
;
SCHOOL,
;
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
]

WOODLANDS III HOLDINGS, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company, BEDFORD
PROPERTY INVESTORS, INC., a
Maryland corporation, JDJ PROPERTIES,
INC., a Utah corporation, THE
WOODLANDS BUSINESS PARK
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit
corporation, WASATCH PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corporation,
and JOHN DOES 1-1,000,
Defendants.

245053-1

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS PEACOCK

;
;
;
]
;
;
;1

Civil No. 960908063 PR

:

;)
'
]

Judge Sandra N. Peuler

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
DENNIS PEACOCK, having been duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I state the following facts upon my own personal knowledge and if called upon to

testify concerning these facts I would be competent to do so.
2.

I am employed by Wasatch Property Management as the Facilities Manager of the

Woodlands Business Park, which is located at approximately 4000 South 700 East in Salt Lake
City, Utah. I am presently at the Woodlands Business Park on a daily basis and have been
continuously employed at the Woodlands Business Park since approximately 1985.
3.

The construction of Tower IV at the Woodlands Business Park was commenced

in June 2000 and was completed in July 2001. It is today only partially leased and the most
direct and best access to Tower IV is from 700 East, not the right of way easement from 900
East.
4.

I have observed that many of those who use the right of way between 900 East

and the Woodlands Business Park are Lutheran High School students who get to school by
driving tlirough the Woodlands Business Park from 700 East, or neighborhood residents who cut
through the Woodlands Business Park from 900 East to 700 East, or residential condominium
owners who live in a condominium development immediately north of the Lutheran High
School. The right of way also provides access to fire trucks and ambulances.
5.

The Woodlands Business Park has four main entrances on 700 East which is the

primary route of most of the tenants and patrons of the Woodlands Business Park.

245053-1
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6.

The right of way from 900 East is regularly maintained year round and is plowed

throughout the winter by Wasatch Property Management under a maintenance contract with The
Woodlands Business Park Association. The High School does not maintain the right of way.
*% Vi

DATED this

day of April 2002.
—

//

U /t/lU)
Dennis Peacock

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
NOTARY PUBLIC

.4

Annette E. Clark
81S South Stilt, 12th f*
8*H Lake City, UUt» 841H

My CommlMion Expire*
November 20.2002
STATE OF UTAH

245053-1

day of April, 2002.

Notary Public

3

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
On the 7%- day of April. 2002.1 hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS PEACOCK, by hand delivering said document as
follows:
Robert M. Taylor
SueJ.Chon
TAYLOR. ADAMS. LOWE & HUTCHINSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2180 South 1300 East. Suite 520
Salt Lake City. UT 84106
Ronald G. Russell
Pair, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless
Attorneys for Bedford Property Investors. Inc.
185 South State. #1300
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111

245053-1

A

TabG

Woodlindj 111 HoWing* LLC
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Bedford Mv^'ty ia-mscri lnc
270 lafi*ttt? CmW
Ufi>mt CA *<M9

It is acknowledged and i^rrcd h% thr *>twiit»nn »nd it* Members rtut the o*.-nrr of Parrel
developed with uiipfutcinciH* in the ruiuie
Section 6 No Parking Right Notwithstanding mything to the contrary
contained in the Declaration as amended it is hereby acknowledged and agreed that
admission of the Additional Property to the Association in no v.ay transfers to Bedford or
any subsequent owner of the Additional Propcrt) any nght whatsocNer any right to park on
the existing Parking Structure (as it ma> be modified in the future), the Common Parking
Areas or the ljmitcd Parking Areas of the Woodlands Dusiness Park as existed prior to this
amendment, unless such parking is approved by trie unanimous vote of the Members of the
Association Nothing contained in this Section 6 shall affect any right of Bedford, as the
owner of Parcel 3. and the tenants. tn> iters and employees of the improvements thereon, to
park within the existing Parking Structure
Sectwn 7 No Casement It is hereby acknowledged and agreed that
admission of the Additional Propert) to the Association in no way permits the use of that
certain 'Associates Road* a)" adjacent to the eastern boundanr of the Association, as defined
in that Declaration of nascments Covenants and Restrictions recorded October 27. 1983 as
Entry No 3562239 in Book ^502 at Page 1559 of the official records of the Salt Lake
County Recorder
Section 8 Arfritniion In the ocnt that any vote of the Association becomes
deadlocked, such that a majority of the votes arc not cast for or against any item upon which
the Association is required to vote, my Member of the Association, upon not less than ten (10)
days' pnor written notice to the other Members of the Association may submit such maner 'o
arbitration in acrordancc with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association In connection *!th such proceeding the Owners of Parcels 2 4 and 5 shall
together be entitled to select one arbitrator the Owners of Parcels IA 3 and the Northern
Tract shall be entitled to select a second arbttntor and those two arbitrators shall together
select a third arbitrator for the panel The fees and expenses of the first two arbitrators shall
be paid by the pan) selecting that arbitrator and the fees and expenses of the third arbitrator
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CHECK OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FOR
REPORTING OF OPINIONS AND WEIGHT OF
LEGAL AUTHORITY.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Twelfth District, Brown
County.
Michael D. PROFFITT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Michael PLYMESSER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
No. CA2000-04-008.
June 25, 2001.
Robert F. Benintendi,
plaintiffs-appellees.

Georgetown,

OH,

for

Danny R. Bubp and Richard D. Weghorst, West
Union, OH, for defendants- appellants.
OPINION
VALEN.
*1 Defendants-appellants, Michael D. and Leslie
Tricia Plymesser, appeal a Brown County Court of
Common Pleas decision resolving a dispute about
the use of a right-of-way. Based upon the analysis
that follows, the decision of the trial court is
affirmed.
Plaintiffs-appellees, Michael D., Jack W., and
Charlotte Proffitt, own land near Free Soil Road in
Georgetown, Ohio, adjacent to land owned by
appellants. Appellants and the Proffitts both farm
their land. Their properties share a common
boundary. The Proffitts have a right of ingress and
egress across appellants' land to access Free Soil
Road. The parties agree that this right- of-way was
created by a grant in the deed to the property now
owned
by
appellants.
This
easement
is
acknowledged in the current deeds held by
appellants and the Proffitts.
The Proffitts filed a complaint against appellants

alleging, inter alia, that appellants had illegally
erected gates across the right-of-way. Appellants
filed a counterclaim that requested, inter alia, a
determination of the extent of the Proffitts' right to
use the right-of-way for ingress and egress.
The trial judge visited the land owned by
appellants and the Proffitts to view the right-of-way
and its surrounding area. After a two-day bench
trial, the trial court issued a decision resolving the
right-of-way dispute between the parties. Appellants
appeal, raising three assignments of error for our
consideration.
Assignment of Error No. 1:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING
APPELLANTS, THE SERVIENT ESTATE
OWNERS, TO REMOVE THEIR GATES
FROM
THE
TERMINI
OF
THE
RIGHT-OF-WAY EASEMENT.
An easement is "the grant of a use on the land of
another." Alban v. R.K. Co. (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d
229, 231. More specifically, an easement is "a right,
without profit, created by grant or prescription,
which the owner of one estate, called the dominant
estate, may exercise in or over the estate of another,
called the servient estate, for the benefit of the
former." Trattar v. Rausch (1950), 154 Ohio St.
286, paragraph one of the syllabus. An easement
"may be acquired only by grant, express or implied,
or by prescription." Id. at paragraph two of the
syllabus.
A trial court's interpretation of an easement will be
reviewed de novo, but any reasonable findings of
fact will be upheld if the reviewing court determines
that the trial court's decision is supported by
competent, credible evidence. Murray v. Lyon
(1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 215, 219. "The underlying
rationale of giving deference to the findings of the
trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial
judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe
their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and
use these observations in weighing the credibility of
the proffered testimony." Myers v. Garson (1993),
66 Ohio St.3d 610, 615, quoting Seasons Coal Co.
v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80.
In their first assignment of error, appellants
challenge the trial court's decision to order them to
remove the two gates that are located at the ends of
the right-of-way. The Supreme Court of Ohio has
previously held that "[t]he owner of the servient
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estate may use the land for any purpose that does
not interfere with the easement, and, in the absence
of anything in the deed, or in the circumstances
under which it was acquired or used, showing that
the way is to be an open one, he may put gates or
bars across it, unless they would unreasonably
interfere with its use" (Emphasis added.) Gibbons
v. Ebding (1904), 70 Ohio St. 298, paragraph two
of syllabus. Appellants argue that the trial court
failed to properly follow the precedent established
by Gibbons when it ordered the removal of the
gates that had been erected by appellants. We
disagree.
*2 The trial court determined that the gates at the
ends of the right-of- way unreasonably interfered
with the Proffitts' use of the right-of-way.
Specifically, the trial court found that "[t]o require a
person to stop, open the gate, traverse the gate, get
out and close the gate, upon each and every
entrance and exit would appear to be an
unreasonable burden in this particular situation."
Moreover, the trial court found that the gate located
at the top of the right-of-way "does constitute a
hazard, or at the very least a significant problem, for
those attempting to negotiate the left turn onto the
Proffitts' property."
The trial testimony of several witnesses
demonstrated that the gates unreasonably burdened
the use of the right-of-way. Michael Proffitt
testified that after restrictive gates were erected at
the ends of the right-of-way in 1998, he and his
tenants began experiencing problems in driving
farm equipment up the right-of-way. Several tenants
of the Proffitts' land testified that it is a hazard to
stop a tractor on the steep hillside and then to open
the gate at the top of the right-of-way. One man
who raised tobacco for the Proffitts testified that
his tobacco cutter could not pass through the gate
because it was too narrow. A man who boards
horses at the Proffitts' farm testified that his trailer
had once become stuck in one set of gates. In
addition, a paramedic testified that he was unable to
drive a life-squad vehicle up the right-of-way and
through the narrow gates.
We find that the trial court's determination that the
erection of gates unreasonably interfered with the
Proffitts' use of the right-of-way is supported by
competent, credible evidence. The first assignment
of error is overruled.

Assignment of Error No. 2:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING
THAT IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
APPELLANTS, THE SERVIENT ESTATE
OWNERS, TO BUILD A FENCE ALONG THE
EAST SIDE OF THE RIGHT-OF-WAY
EASEMENT IF THEY INTEND TO ENCLOSE
LIVESTOCK FOR GRAZING PURPOSES.
At trial, Michael Plymesser testified that he
intended to graze animals that would have access to
the right-of-way and would graze on the
right-of-way. He testified that his farm already has
some horses and that he plans on raising cattle.
Several witnesses testified that it would be a hazard
to allow animals to graze along the right-of-way,
where farmers move loads of hay, tobacco, and
other crops using large farming vehicles. One
witness testified that it would be dangerous for both
the driver and the animals.
An owner of a servient estate may notexercise his
rights in such a way as to unreasonably interfere
with the special use for which the easement was
created. Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Ry. Co. v.
Wachter (1904), 70 Ohio St. 113, 118; Columbia
Gas Transm. Corp. v. Bennett (1990), 71 Ohio
App.3d 307, 319. Recognizing that appellants
intended to graze livestock along the right-of-way
and that the gates that had pieviously kept the
livestock away from the right-of-way were to be
removed, the trial court ordered appellants to build
a fence along the right-of-way to enclose such
livestock. The trial testimony indicates that allowing
livestock to graze in the right-of-way would create a
hazard that would be an unreasonable burden upon
the use of the easement. Therefore, we overrule
appellant's second assignment of error.
*3 Assignment of Error No. 3:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING
THAT
THE
APPELLANTS
DID NOT
ESTABLISH BY A PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE THAT THE APPELLEES'
USE OF THE RIGHT-OF-WAY SHOULD BE
LIMITED IN ANY FASHION WHATSOEVER.
The
trial
court
denied
appellants' fifth
counterclaim, which alleges that the Proffitts1 use
of the right-of-way should be limited in accordance
with the original intent of the grantor. Appellants
argue that the Proffitts should not be permitted to
increase the physical dimensions of the
right-of-way. Appellants argue that whereas the
right-of-way was never intended to be "anything
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more than a narrow farm path for agricultural
ingress and egress," the Proffitts now want to
"traverse it with huge, modern farm equipment."
The testimony at trial established that tenants of the
Proffitts' farm routinely accessed the Proffitts'
land by using the right-of-way, and that the size of
the machinery used to farm the land had increased
over the years.
In its decision and judgment entry, the trial court
stated:
The Court specifically orders that * * * fencing
shall not interfere with farm equipment or
machinery of the size regarding which Plaintiffs'
tenants testified during this trial. The Court
specifically recall [sic ] Scott Malott's four row
setter as being a "big outfit." The Court does not
believe that this right-of-way should be restricted
to prevent such equipment or machinery.
The grant of an easement is not made for present
use alone but anticipates future use; for example,
easements for ingress and egress, which were
originally granted to allow horse-drawn vehicles,
later provided the owner of the dominant estate the
right to travel with automobiles and trucks, modern
means of transportation. Realty Title & Investment
Co. v. Fairport, Painesville & Eastern Rd. Co.
(1919), 12 Ohio App. 73, 79. "[T]he exercise of the
right is not to be confined to the modes in vogue
when it was first acquired. The owner * * * may
keep pace with the progress of invention and
ingenuity, so far as is necessary to a profitable
working of his property in competition with rivals."
Id. at 80, quoting Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining
Co., 55 N.Y. 538, 551. We find that the trial court
correctly determined that the size of the modern
farming equipment in use should be accommodated.
Appellants further argue that the right-of-way is
being used improperly for ingress and egress to
property other than that specified at the easement's
creation. Appellants claim that the original intent of
the grant of the easement was to access a
seventy-acre tract of land. Appellants assert that the
seventy-acre tract is a part of the one hundred
eighty-five acres of land currently owned by the
Proffitts. Appellants reason that the right-of-way
can be used only to access the seventy-acre tract of
land.
The Proffitts argue that appellants did not even
demonstrate that there has been an additional use of
the right-of-way. The Proffitts contend that the

evidence presented at trial did not show that the
farming activity on their land took place anywhere
other than the original seventy-acre tract. However,
the trial court assumed in its decision that the
Proffitts were using the right-of-way to access
additional acreage adjoining the seventy-acre tract.
We defer to this factual finding by the trial court
judge, who not only had the benefit of hearing the
testimony from the trial but also visited the
properties of the feuding parties.
*4 Appellants insist that according to Berardi v.
Ohio Turnpike Comm. (1965), 1 Ohio App.2d 365,
this court should find that an easement can only be
used in connection with the estate to which it is
appurtenant and cannot be extended by the owner to
any other property which he may then own or
afterward acquire, unless this is provided for in the
instrument in which the easement is created. We
note that although the Eighth District Court of
Appeals makes this general statement of law in
Berardi, that court thereafter acknowledged that this
issue had not been raised by the pleadings and was
not before that court. Therefore, this statement of
law is merely dicta.
Nevertheless, we note that this statement of law
from Berardi was adopted and followed by the Fifth
District Court of Appeals in State ex rel Fisher v.
McNutt (1992), 73 Ohio App.3d 403. In that case,
the court determined that an easement appurtenant
originally granted for access to approximately
seventy acres of land could not be used to gain
access for managing an adjoining forest that was
nearly five thousand acres in size, where such use
enhanced the burden of servient estate by sixty
times. Id. at 408. Among the activities included in
the proposed management of this forest were timber
harvesting, mineral management, and recreation
development. Id. at 405. In its analysis, the McNutt
court initially acknowledged that upon examining
the instrument that created the easement reasonable
minds could only conclude that intentions of the
original grantor and grantee of the easement were
that the right-of-way would be used solely for
ingress and egress to the original seventy acres. Id.
The court also stated:
Furthermore, the state's plan to use the
right-of-way
easement to conduct forest
management on the entire 4,842.30 acres of land
would enhance the burden on appellants' servient
estate by sixty times. This certainly is an
unreasonable increase in the burden to the
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servient estate and could not have been intended
by the original grantor and grantee.
In the case sub judice, appellants quote the
original grant of easement from Brown County deed
records, but this deed was not an exhibit at trial and
is not part of the record before us. The current
deeds to the land owned by the Proffitts and
appellants were admitted into evidence at trial, but
neither the Proffitts nor appellants owned their
lands when the easement was created in 1924.
Without the opportunity to examine the exact
language used in the creation of the easement, we
will not conclude, as did the McNutt court, that the
intentions of the original grantor and grantee of the
easement were that the right-of-way would be used
only for ingress and egress of the adjoining
seventy-acre lot.
In this case, the Proffitts are using the right-of-way
to access an additional one hundred fifteen acres of
land. Appellants failed to show that the additional
use of theright-of-way to access acreage beyond the
seventy-acre tract placed an additional burden upon
the servient estate. Although appellants complain
about the farming vehicles that traversed the
right-of-way, appellants did not show that there was
any measurable increase in traffic on the right-ofway due to traffic accessing acreage beyond the
seventy-acre plat. See Centel Cable Television Co.
of Ohio v. Cook (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 8, 12
(holding that a new and additional use of an
easement was permissible where it was similar to
the use already granted and did not place an
additional burden upon the servient estate).
*5 After considering the evidence presented to the
trial court, we find that the Proffitts' use of the
right-of-way is not an unreasonable increase in the
burden to the servient estate that could not have
been intended by the original grantor and grantee.
See McNutt, 73 Ohio App.3d at 408. Therefore, the
trial court properly determined that the Proffitts1
current use of the right-of-way need not be limited.
The third assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
WALSH and POWELL, JJ., concur.
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